As a mandatory system for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) has become one of the most critical avionics for future aviation. However, the system's vulnerability and insecurity have also raised both specific concerns and controversies. In this article, the authors propose the utilization of Phase Shift Keying (PSK) modulation to overcome the well-known issues related to this avionics system. By combining PSK modulation with the Pulse Position Modulation (PPM) of standard ADS-B, this Secure ADS-B (SADS-B) avionics system offers not only the possibility of quintuple the payload of the predecessor, but also compatibility with the standards, the requirements, and the infrastructures of the current-in-use ADS-B In/Out. To demonstrate the feasibility of this approach, the works in this paper contain both Hardwarein-the-loop (HIL) simulations and flight test results from the proposed SADS-B. From these results, it can be seen that, on the one hand, by encrypting the extra phase-modulated bits to create digital signatures, SADS-B is capable of authenticating messages, thus increasing the robustness and security level of the system against Hazardously Misleading Information (HMI) attacks; on the other hand, the extra bits integrated in SADS-B can represent the needed answer to enhance the capacities and efficiency of the ADS-B for future avionics via different applications.
I. Introduction
The obligation of this avionics in US and European airspace (starting in January and June 2020 respectively [1, 4] ) leads to a significant increase in the number of airplane equipped with it, particularly in the last few years. As outlined by the FAA, at the end of October 2017, 27% of Fixed Wing airplanes in the US were equipped with ADS-B Out (corresponding to about 162,000 registered aircraft [5, 6] ), with a steady increase rate of around 4%/month (Fig. 3) observed. However, the development of this avionics system has also lead to increasing worries about the security risks and privacy issues it poses. In 2012, a white-hat hacker, B. Haines (aka "RenderMan") showed that with Cost-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment and a Software Defined Radio (SDR) program, almost anyone could inject ghost airplanes into the receiver, and engaging in an intentional HMI attack [7] . A few years later, in one of the first complete studies of the security problems related to ADS-B avionics, D. L. McCallie categorized these risks into different groups related to the type of targets and danger levels [8] . Based on this and other related studies in [9] [10] [11] , as well as authors' perspectives, these risks are can be summarized as shown in Table 1 . The challenge of increasing the security of this avionics system has long been an important study topic in avionics, involving both the FAA and other researchers. Even while rejecting the use of encryption to protect data ("encryption of any ADS-B data would unnecessarily limit its use internationally" [13] ), the FAA has also studied different solutions for increasing privacy, including, for example, anonymous ADS-B and aircraft register database protection [14] . Meanwhile, to protect the system against HMI attacks, several approaches have been offered. In 2006, in one of the first studies looking at solutions to enhance future ADS-B systems, K. Samuelson et al. proposed the using of the Message Authentication Code (MAC) to increase the integrity of UAT messages [15] . This approach, however, is not compatible with the ADS-B 1090 ES, due to the limited payload and the fixed message format characterizing the latter. A few years later, while D. L. McCallie also mentioned the authentication solution and channel encryption as means of increasing the integrity and protection of data in 1090 MHz ADS-B, this work, however, provided no clear suggestion. In 2014, in his Ph.D. study, K. D. Wesson, first discussed the digital signature as a solution for key storage and distribution [16] . By studying both the Symmetric and Asymmetric Cryptography approaches, he finally concluded that implementing encryption in ADS-B would eventually increase the risk of collision and complicate the management procedure, without any clear impact on increasing of securing the system. From the above-mentioned and other studies, such as [17, 18] , it can be seen that a secure ADS-B avionics can be achieved, but with certain trade-offs. The most critical point illustrated by these studies is the need to modify the current ADS-B message format, including encryption and adding extra bits for authenticating the transmitted data. In any case, once implemented, these approaches will require a significant upgrading of the current infrastructure for both ground and air equipment. Also, in certain cases, these solutions demand a broader bandwidth, due to the increase in the number of bits associated with them. With the number of the installed systems, and with the limited time left for the 2020 deadline, these approaches are impractical and unfeasible.
In 2015, in an effort to develop a new approach to these issues, Yeste-Ojeda and Landry proposed the use of Phase Shift Keying (PSK) modulation in the current ADS-B signal [9] , forming a Secure ADS-B (SADS-B) avionics system. On the one hand, the combination of both modulations in the ADS-B message (the standard Pulse-Position Modulation (PPM) and PSK modulation) is compatible with the standards of ADS-B In/Out, as shown in [12] . This feature means that no modifications are required for integrating this modified ADS-B and that both SADS-B and ADS-B can operate together. On the other hand, SADS-B can authenticate the ASD-B message and increase the robustness of the system against HMI attacks, without the need for expanded bandwidth. In fact, because both position data and signature can be processed independently, the receiver can still have a clear idea of the position of the transmitter even without the key (but with a lower integrity level), which thus eliminates the key distribution problem mentioned by K. D. Wesson in his work. From another perspective, the integration of phase-modulated bits quintuples the data of the current ADS-B, and allows this avionics system to be enhanced for future applications [12] . SADS-B can therefore be considered as the most promising solution for securing and enhancing the ADS-B.
The works presented in this paper can be considered as the first complete demonstration of the promising SADS-B system. First, Section III and IV focus on an overview of the ADS-B 1090 ES, the SADS-B approach, the encryption solution and implementation, respectively. Secondly, to show the functionality and capacity of the system, two types of tests will be shown. In Section V, Hardware-in-the-loop in a controlled environment (laboratory) will be presented, which will provide a general view of the performance of the system. Next, in Section VI, the authors will present details of flight tests (installation, trajectory, scenarios, etc.) and the results of this innovative avionics system. Finally, in Section VII, based on the discussed results, conclusions will be drawn, as well as suggestions for further studies.
II. ADS-B and SADS-B Overview
A. Standard ADS-B Table 2 below summarizes the principal specifications of ADS-B 1090 ES, as specified and defined in the documents of Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, EUROCONTROL and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) [2, 19, 20] . (Fig. 4) 
Fig. 4 ADS-B Message Format
As can be seen from the Table and Fig. , apart from the 24-bit Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC), the standard ADS-B has no integrated solution to verify the integrity of the received signal. Without encryption and a solution for authenticating the payload, anyone can create a "ghost airplane" using COTS components and a SDR program [10] . Furthermore, by using PPM (or PAM), ADS-B offers a very robust performance against low-level SNR. However, it requires a wide spectrum to cover the high data rate involved. The short payload of ADS-B naturally means that this avionics system can support a big number of airplane, particularly in high density area around the airports. Nevertheless, this feature also leads to strictly limitation on the number of solutions that can be used to enhance and secure the standard ADS-B.
B. Secure ADS-B (SADS-B)
To some extent, SADS-B can overcome most of the limitations in the current ADS-B. Firstly, with phasemodulated bits using Differential 16 PSK (D16PSK), SADS-B increases the number of useful bits from 112 bits to 560 bits. Since SADS-B carries both standard 112 bits of ADS-B and an additional 448 phase-modulated bits, each section can be processed separately and independently. As a result, no modification is needed for the PAM section of the SADS-B, and ADS-B In can receive and decode SADS-B Out correctly, and vice versa. However, because of the sensitivity of D16PSK with respect to the PAM, some consideration should be given to increasing the general performance of this phase-modulated payload. In this work, the authors propose the use of Forward Error Correction (FEC), in particular, Reed Solomon (RS), to boost the general performance of the 448-bit PSK payload. As can be seen from Fig. 5 , compared to the D16PSK (black line), D16PSK with RS (dash line) reduces the Bit Error Rate (BER) remarkably, particularly when the Signal-to-Noise Radio (SNR) is above 14 dB. Although this performance cannot compare to that of PAM (blue line), integrating RS in the phase-modulated payload is still a must in order to increase the performance of the system. In general, the longer the FEC, the more robust the system. However, since the number of the bits is limited, increasing FEC bytes means reducing the useful payload for real applications. Balancing performance and a useful payload will be one of the critical challenges in this implementation going forward. In this study, the authors chose the RS(255,247) solution, which needs 64 phase-modulated bits (~14.28% total payload), and can correct up to 4 bytes errors (or 32-bit burst error) in total. Besides the RS field, the authors also propose two other fixed fields in the payload of the PSK bits: an Access Code of up to 24 bits at the beginning of the payload, and a standard 32-bit CRC before the RS at the end of the payload. The 24-bit Access Code is reserved for any future developments; for example, categorizing the type of application integrated in these bits. Meanwhile, the 32-bit CRC section is used to verify the integrity of bits after being blind corrected by the RS to avoid any unwanted behavior. After reserving the fixed fields, there are 328 bits left in the PSK payload, and depending on the interests of the user, different approaches can be adopted. In a previous study [12] , the authors discussed three types of applications for these bits, ranging from the 328-bit digital signature to full payload utilization with ADS-B compress mode. As a rule, the longer the signature, the higher the security level against attacks, however, it will also reduce the payload for any other applications. In this work, as will be implemented later in the HIL simulation and in the flight test, the authors use a balanced approach between the two options, with a 16-byte (128-bit) digital signature to authenticate the message. Figure 6 presents the final SADS-B message format as discussed, both for PAM and PSK bits.
Fig. 6 Proposed SADS-B Message Structure
Of all cryptography algorithms, the authors in this work studied only the use of the symmetric-key Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in encrypting the digital signature, due to its high security level and its availability in C++ and Python (with gr-openssl 7 Out-Of-Tree Module and Python Crypto, respectively). Among the available AES modes, this study focuses only on the Electronic Code Book (ECB) and CFB (Cipher Feedback), since they represent two different characteristics of AES encryption. The first one, ECB, is famous for its simplicity, calculating resource optimization [21] , and does not need a synchronization solution between the transmitter (encryption) and receiver (decryption). Moreover, as discussed by N. R. Potlapally et al., this mode also offers an energy consumption advantage over other AES operation modes [22] . However, the downside of this algorithm is its low-level of integrity compared to the other AES modes, in particular, when encrypted data repeat certain specific fields. In fact, as mentioned in various documents dealing with cryptography ( [23] , for example), one needs to consider other modes before looking at the ECB due to the vulnerability of the latter. The CFB mode can be viewed as the opposite of the first mode, and offers a very high level of security. However, as a trade-off, a synchronization solution needs to be established between the TX and RX. In other words, even if it has the keys, the RX will need at least two encrypted packages before decrypting the data correctly. More details of these encrypt solutions, as well as their implementation in this study, can be found in the next sections.
III. SADS-B Implementation
A. System Overview Figure 7 shows the main components of the SADS-B In and SADS-B Out architecture, along with their relations. As a part of the Multi-Mode Software Defined Avionics Radio (MM-SDAR) [24] , SDAS-B contains three main modules: from left to right, RF High-Power Front-End, SDR platform, and General Purpose Processor (GPP). In RX, the signal from the antenna goes through a bandpass filter to attenuate any out-of-interest frequency. The filtered signal is then fed into the SDR platform. After being sampled by the Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC), IQ signals are filtered by a digital low-pass filter before passing to the GPP. In the GPP, the complex signal containing I and Q data is processed separately and independently in amplitude and phase, corresponding to PPM and PSK bits. Depending on both PPM and PSK data, the GPP will decide whether or not the received signal is valid, as well as what further steps to take. In TX, using the GPS data, the encryption keys and access code, phase-modulated bits, and ADS-B message can be built. These data are later sent to the SDR platform for the output signal to be reconstructed by the Digital-to-Analog Converter (DAC). The RF High Power Front-End amplifies the low power signal, and then emits it into the air. Table 3 summarizes the main components of the RF High Power Front-End, along with the important features of the system. Photos of this module in real life (flight test) can be found below in the Appendix. 
Fig. 7 SADS-B In/Out Architecture Overview

B. RF High Power Front-End
C. SDR Platform
The primary objective of this module, as described earlier, was to IQ demodulate/modulate the signal, corresponding to SADS-B In/Out respectively. In this project, PicoZepto and PicoSDR of Nutaq 8 were the two selected SDR platforms. Both SDR are based on the Zero Intermediate Frequency (Zero-IF) RF architecture and perform similarly in terms of the ADC and DAC (12-bit resolution, 40 MHz sampling rate). In order to overcome the well-known problems of the Zero-IF architecture, i.e. DC Offset and IQ imbalance [25, 26] , a low-IF technique was implemented in both systems, with a shift of 5 MHz from the 1090 MHz of the standard ADS-B. The Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) bitstream of both platforms was specifically designed using the Xilinx Suite/Xilinx Vivado Suite. Both SDR platforms could be used as SADS-B In/Out separately or together; however, only PicoSDR was used as the SDR module in the MM-SDAR for the flight tests. The implementation of this MM-SDAR, as well as more details about this innovative avionic architecture, can be consulted in [24] .
D. General Purpose Processor
The open-source SDR program GNU Radio 9 is at the core of the GPP. Depending on the tasks assigned in the processing flow, specified Out-Of-Tree blocks will be created. For example, Figure 8 illustrates the calculation procedure for building the SADS-B message. From the inputs, including GPS data, encryption keys and operation mode, the ADS-B message and SADS-B phase-modulated bits will be placed in the corresponding positions described in Fig. 6 above. To synchronize the two payloads, as well as to economize the Ethernet bandwidth, Amplitude and Phase information on the output signal is transmitted together in a 32-bit integer channel. These data are then separated in the FPGA to create the IQ outputs for the DAC. 
E. Spectrum and Signal Validation
To ensure that the SADS-B can meet all the requirements for a standard ADS-B avionics system, tests were conducted in the laboratory using both certified equipment (Aeroflex IFR-6000) and a Mixed Domain Oscilloscope (MDO). A detailed discussion of these verifications can be found in [12] . Figure 9 and Fig. 10 demonstrate the differences in phase, amplitude, and spectrum (from top to bottom) between ADS-B and SADS-B, respectively, for the same payload in the amplitude-modulated bits. As can be seen, although SADS-B has a different spectrum from that of ADS-B, it still meets the requirements, represented by the white frame in both Figs. This is confirmed by the tests using IFR-6000, as can be seen in Fig. 11 for a Type 9 message. Table 4 illustrates the compatibility of SADS In/Out with ADS-B In/Out, as a result of these validations. Figure 12 presents the settings for the HIL simulation. In short, the GPS data for SADS-B messages were created by the X-Plane 10, via a standard approach scenario from a distance of 10 NM to Runway 06L of Montreal's Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport (CYUL). These data are transmitted to the GPP of SADS-B Out via Ethernet, along with the UTC for the GPP of SADS-B In. This UTC is considered as the reference UTC of the receiver. From these data, SADS-B messages will be built and sent to the SDR platform. The TX port of SADS-B Out is wired with the RX of SADS-B In. After being IQ demodulated, these data will be passed to the GPP of the SADS-B In, and then both PAM and PSK data will be extracted. The SADS-B Out is set to transmit at a rate of 2 Hz for message Type 9 and Type 19, and 0.2 Hz for Type 4, as a standard ADS-B. The PSK bits are configured to update with each Type 9 message, i.e., around 2 Hz. The output of the SADS-B Out is also connected with the IFR-6000, which is used to monitor the output signal. In this simulation, AES in mode ECB is used as the cryptography algorithm for encrypting the digital signature. A total of three tries were completed, each lasting three to four minutes.
IV. Hardware-in-the-loop Simulation Scenario and Results
A. Simulation Scenario and Configuration
Fig 12 HIL Simulation Configuration
B. Simulation Results and Performance Analysis
In SADS-B In, both PAM data (as a standard ADS-B) and PSK data are processed. However, in the case of PSK bits, after being decoded, they are verified by RS, and then CRC, before being decrypted. Furthermore, using Eq. (1), the SNR value of the signal received in the SADS-B In can be estimated, marking a level of around 16 to 19 dB. Besides analyzing the received standard ADS-B data, the post-test analyzing procedure also analyzes the decrypted bits, concentrating on the UTC and the position data. Figure 13 illustrates the position where SADS-B In received the PSK digital signature (black circle), along with the trajectory (blue line) for the second try. It can be seen that the encrypted data in the digital signature follow those of the trajectory closely. In fact, the statistics show that the SADS-B In received and decoded correctly around 90% of the signatures created. Fig. 14 shows the results of all three tries, in terms of the number of messages received in IFR-6000 (representing a standard ADS-B In) and in the SADS-B In. On the one hand, the figure also once again confirms the compatibility of SADS-B Out with the current-in-use ADS-B In. On the other hand, it also shows the similarity in the performances of the certified equipment for ADS-B In and the developed SADS-B In. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 15 , the amount of data received by each system has big difference. In fact, as can be seen, the standard ADS-B In extracted only around one-fifth of the data compared to SADS-B In. This result, therefore, confirms the theory that SADS-B can quintuple the capacity of the ADS-B avionics system without causing any degradation in the performance. 
Fig. 15 Throughput Analysis for ADS-B In and SADS-In
Meanwhile, with the reference UTC and the decrypted UTC from the received signature, the distribution of the differences can be calculated, as demonstrated in Fig. 16 . Here, one can see that more than 92% of the differences are less than or equal to one second, and that almost all of them are equal to or less than two seconds. These statistics confirm the idea mentioned in previous studies related to the PSK signature and the timestamps for validating received messages [9] . As can be seen, a resolution of 2 seconds for the timestamp and a 2.8-second window for authenticating the transmitted message is enough for this application. Table 5 below summarizes the analysis above, along with other statistical results, for an average of all three tries. 
V. Flight Test Scenarios and Performance Analysis
A. Flight Test Scenarios
Although the validations in a controlled environment and HIL simulation showed the functionality and the capacity of the modified ADS-B, they are not enough to lead to a conclusion on the performance of the system. To have a detailed evaluation of this innovative avionics system, real world tests, in particular, flight tests, had to be done. In the context of this work, from June 2017, right after a license was obtained from the authorities, SADS-B, as a module in the MM-SDAR, was flight-tested around Montreal in a Cessna 172 Skyhawk. Table 6 summarizes the flight information and the primary objectives of these tests. A general description of one of these flights can be found in Fig.  17 , together with the tested avionics in the flight.
In this Section, as the main objective of this article, authors will only concentrate on analyzing the results of the flights related to SADS-B, which can be divided into two groups, as shown in Table 6 . The first focuses on Flights 13 to 19 (SASD-B but fixed and unencrypted PSK bits), and the latter on the most recent flight with a real dynamic encrypted digital signature (Flight No. 21). 
Table 6 SADS-B Flight Tests Dates and Objectives
Flight
B. Equipment under Test (EUT) Installation
One of the most challenging aspects of the flight tests was the installation of the Equipment Under Test (EUT) in the Cessna, along with the supporting components (batteries and RF High Power (HP) FrontEnd) and the operators. Great efforts were made to ensure that the installation would not affect the safety and normal operating conditions of the Cessna, meanwhile optimizing the on-air duration. The EUT was powered by two separated batteries, one for the RF Front-End with amplifier, and the second for the GPP/SDR platform. A third battery was also mounted as a backup for the previous two. Using this setup, the cruise time of each flight would be around 90 to 120 minutes, depending on the tested avionics and other weather conditions. The configuration in the airplane was as shown in Fig. 18 , and real photos of these components can be found in the Appendix. The output power of each avionics system from the airplane was fixed at 50 W for TMS, SADS-B Out, Distance Measurement Equipment (DME), and 10 W for WBR, as specified in the license. On the ground, two stations were established separately for WBR (TX and RX) and SASD-B In, with the settings for the latter as shown in Fig. 19 . 19 As mentioned in Table 6 , during these flight tests, no cryptography solution, i.e., no dynamic digital signature, was integrated. Instead, the phase-modulated bits were filled with a pre-calculated and fixed payload to simplify the monitoring process for SADS-B In on the ground. The results of these flights contain both standard ADS-B data and PSK information, and are post-test analyzed in the laboratory using Python and MATLAB scripts, focusing on the following measurements:
1) The rate of correct signature for the received ADS-B message.
2) The effect of RS on the signature/message rate mentioned in point 1.
3) The position of the airplane when the SADS-B messages, especially the PSK data, are received.
4) The slant range between the airplane and MGS, as well as the estimated SNR level.
5) The performance of SADS-B In versus ADS-B Out from other airplanes, compared to that of the standard ADS-B In. Figure 20 below illustrates the signature/message rate results from one of the flights. On the left, the chart shows that SADS-B can correctly extract 74% of the data carried by the phase-modulated component bit-by-bit, in comparison with the number of messages received. Furthermore, as outlined with the black-line section in the pie chart and the bar graph on the right, the integrated RS(255, 247) FEC can increase this number by 11%, distributed equally in all four cases (from 1 byte to 4 bytes correction). A detailed statistical analysis of these flights confirms this rate, with a variation from 10 to 20%. This result, therefore, confirms the crucial role of RS for the next steps of this study; in particular, the real-time encryption-decryption mechanism. Furthermore, from this figure, it can be concluded that:
1) It is true that the D16PSK modulation is less robust than PPM in a noisy and imperfect transmission channel. Even with the support of FEC, SASD-B In was only able to get 85% of the phase-modulated data from the received SASD-B messages. Nevertheless, it can easily be seen that even with just this 85%, the total throughput of the SADS-B is superior to that of ADS-B, as shown above in the simulation. 2) It is not worth increasing the level of FEC to improve the chances of correcting more byte errors, for example, RS(255, 245) with 5-byte correction. It is true that this integration might increase the performance of the system by an estimated 3%. Nevertheless, the payload for the FEC will need to increase by 3.57% correspondingly. Moreover, a higher-level RS algorithm will eventually need more calculation resources, easily leading to other problems for a real-time decrypting SASD-B In system, especially when this calculation needs to be performed for every ADS-B message. Moreover, it can be seen that the received data are not continuous, but have some short gaps due to missing messages. The missing period increases each time the plane changes the heading for the holding in the test zone. This can be explained by the fact that the position of the SADS-B Out's antenna during these periods is not favorable for the direction of the ground station's antenna. Consequently, the SNR level becomes too low for the receiver to decode the data correctly. Figure 22 shows the relation between the distance of the airplane and the received SADS-B Type 9 messages from the same flight, outlining a maximum distance of around 4.2 km for this test.
At For other flights, similar results were obtained. Figure 24 shows the rate between a correct PSK payload and correct ADS-B messages using SADS-B Out/In for Flight Nos. 13, 14, 15, 16, and 19 . As can be seen, despite the fluctuation of the results caused by the differences in the conditions of each day, this rate is never lower than 65%. More statistical results of these tests are summarized in Table 7 . 1) An update made to the RF HP Front-End to increase the overall SNR before the antenna and increase the isolation between the TX and RX of the system in the airplane. 2) Implementation and testing of cryptography for the first time in SADS-B, using AES-CFB cryptography. As mentioned above, this mode requires a number of continuous messages to correctly synchronize TX and RX, which would be a challenge given the flight test conditions. The format of the PSK payload used in this test was the same as the one in the HIL simulation, as presented in Fig. 6.  3 ) In this test, MGS worked only in RX mode, focusing only on the SADS-B and parallel ADS-B. Also, for the first time, the RS calculation and CRC verification was implemented directly in the GPP to check the integrity of the signature before decrypting. Figure 25 below presents the trajectory of the airplane during this test (line), along with the position where MGS correctly detects and decodes the signature in SADS-B Type 9 messages. From this information, the distance between two systems can be calculated, marking the maximum distance around 5 km, as shown in Fig. 26 . The SNR estimation indicated that the maximum SNR level during this test for SADS-B In is around 19 dB, whereas the lowest level for correctly decoding the signature was found to vary between 6 and 8 dB. A screenshot from the GPP of the ADS-B In is presented in Fig. 27 , along with some important features and functionalities of the MGS during the test. Figures 28, 29 and 30 summarize the results related to the digital signature of this test and the decrypted data in the signatures. In 45 minutes, MGS received, decoded and correctly extracted 3717 signatures (RS and CRC verified). This value is equivalent to 93.9% of the total received SADS-B message. Among these correct signatures, the decryption in the GPP of the ADS-B In could only precisely decrypt 47% of the signature, due to the desynchronization between TX and RX (as described above for AES-CFB). Nevertheless, using only 47% of the decrypted data, the interval between two nearest decrypted UTC was 84%, equal to or less than 2 seconds (Fig. 28) . In order words, the MGS still has at least one correct authentication signature from the SADS-B Out every 2 seconds. Furthermore, by comparing the reference UTC of the MGS and the one received from the decrypted signature (Fig.  30) , one can see that almost all of the difference are in the 2.8-second window proposed by the theory estimation [9] . It is reasonable to believe that the performance related to the decryption of the embedded data in the signature of SADS-B can be further improved, in particular, if AES-ECB is used, as shown in the HIL simulation.
The result of this test, on the one hand, confirms the functionality and capacity of the digital signature using AES cryptography in terms of authenticating the standard ADS-B message. The 128-bit signature (with ICAO address, position data, and UTC) integrated in the 448-bit PSK payload has shown its role in helping the MGS track and follow the SADS-B Out provided in the Cessna, with minimum risk of an HMI attacked. On the other hand, it also shows the ability of SADS-B to increase the efficiency of the current-in-use ADS-B. It is worth noting that 45% of the payload in the PSK component is zeropadded. These extra bits could become the key module for another ground-air data transmission in the future. 
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, the authors presented the implementation of the PSK modulation to increase the payload efficiency of the current ADS-B, forming a Secure ADS-B avionics system. In the case of using these extra payloads as the digital signature, this modified ADS-B offers a solution for authenticating messages in the receivers, increasing the security level of the system without the need for complicated multilateration. This approach has been implemented and tested both in the laboratory using HIL simulation and in real flight tests, with positive and promising outcomes. The results, on the one hand, confirm the compatibility of this SADS-B with standard ADS-B, in both transmission and reception. This advantage is crucial and is the most significant benefit over other approaches proposed in previous studies, since no major modification in the current-in-use infrastructure is required. On the other hand, these results also validate the theory of the 2.8-second window for authenticating received ADS-B messages with digital signatures. This short period will no doubt be essential for SADS-B In to avoid most relay attacks, and with integrated cryptography, other HMI risks as well. Furthermore, as discussed in [12] , the applications of this SADS-B can easily be expanded, depending on the interests of users and the prioritization between security and useful payload. Future research for this project includes, but is not limited to, finding the optimal cryptography mechanism for digital signatures and continuing to improve the performance of the system by both analog and digital approaches. Also, flight tests with commercial airplanes, which is the next step of this study, can also become a good scenario for further testing, and for further enhancing the performance of the system. 
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